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SUMMARY 
 
South Africa’s employment law has undergone more frequent and dynamic changes 
than any area of the law, in recent years. The ability of employers and employees to 
regulate their respective rights and duties vis-à-vis each other by independent 
agreement has been progressively whittled down by statutory intervention. In so 
limiting the capacity of parties to the employment relationship to regulate the nature 
of their relationship, South Africa has followed development in Western industrialised 
nations. 
 
Against this background, the drafters of the Labour Relations Act1 (LRA), as 
amended, proposed a comprehensive framework of law governing the collective 
relations between employers and trade unions in all sectors of the economy. The 
LRA2 created a specialised set of forums and tribunals to deal with labour and 
employment related matters. It established Bargaining Councils, the Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), the Labour Court (LC) and the Labour 
Appeal Court (LAC). It also created procedures designed to accomplish the objective 
of simple, inexpensive and accessible resolution of labour disputes. 
 
In redesigning labour law, the legislature decided that some disputes between 
employers and employees should be dealt with by arbitrators and others by judges. It 
is this distinction that resulted in the creation of the CCMA and the Labour Court to 
perform arbitration and adjudication respectively. The result of adjudication is 
generally subject to appeal to a higher court. The result of arbitration is generally 
subject to review. Arbitration was given statutory recognition in South Africa by the 
Arbitration Act3. That Act provides a framework within which parties in dispute may if 
they wish appoint their own “judge” and supply him or her with their terms of 
reference tailored to their needs. 
 
With the foregoing in mind, the purpose of this work is the provision of a selection of 
landmark cases that dealt with the review function of CCMA awards. This selection 
                                                 
1  Act 66 of 1995 as amended. 
2  Ibid. 
3  Act 42 of 1965. 
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comprises of landmark judgments of the different courts of the land. The study uses, 
as it departure point, legislative framework to elicit the extent to which review is 
extended to the litigants. 
 
Apart from looking at the legislative provisions towards review grounds, reference is 
made to specific landmark judgments that have an effect on this subject in order to 
provide a comprehensive and explicit picture of how CCMA arbitration awards may 
be taken on review. 
 
This study focuses on substantive law developed by the Labour Court, High Court, 
Supreme Court of Appeal and finally the Constitutional Court. This is informed by the 
very nature and scope of the study because any concentration on procedural and 
evidentiary aspects of review could lead to failure to achieve the objectives of the 
study. 
 
It looks at specific South African case law, judgments of the courts and the 
jurisprudence in the field of employment law so that the reader is presented with a 
clearer picture of recent developments in addressing review of arbitration awards. 
 
The concluding remarks are drawn from a variety of approaches used by the 
authorities in the field of employment law in dealing with review of CCMA arbitration 
awards and issues for further research are highlighted. 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND  
 
This treatise provides an analytical study of review of CCMA awards by the Labour 
Court with specific reference to the applicability or otherwise of the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act,4 hereinafter referred to as PAJA.  This study does not 
claim to be profoundly archetypal in the field of employment law relating to review of 
CCMA awards, but it rather seeks to render an input that will contribute to the 
jurisprudence of South African employment law. 
 
The review function by the Labour Court with specific reference to the applicability or 
otherwise of PAJA is significant. It comes about hot on the heels of the debate over 
the applicable grounds for review of CCMA awards, which has continued to trouble 
the labour courts.  The introduction of PAJA5 has added another piece to the 
incomplete puzzle.  This is against the background that different courts of law have 
issued divergent judgments on the same question of the applicability or otherwise of 
PAJA.6 
 
It is consequently submitted that the extensive and optimal use of case law, relevant 
legislation and legal literature applicable in review proceedings will assist the study 
to meet its objectives. 
 
This chapter covers the following sub-topics: 
 
 Objective of the study 
 Structure of the study 
 
                                                 
4  Act 3 of 2000. 
5  Ibid. 
6  Ibid. 
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1.2 THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
 
The aim of the treatise is to advocate that PAJA is not applicable to arbitration 
awards and orders issued and made by the CCMA.  It was not until the 
Constitutional Court pronounced on this issue that PAJA is not applicable in review 
of CCMA awards.  To date, the case law bears testimony to the fact that there were 
as many opinions on the topic as there are judges.  The latest judgments by the 
Constitutional Court on this subject will serve to settle the long debate over whether 
or not the CCMA was subject to review under the more limited grounds set out in 
section 145 of the LRA, or whether or not the Labour Court could invoke the 
provisions of PAJA for this purpose. 
 
1.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
 
This study consists of five (5) chapters. Chapter two (2) provides a discussion on the 
legislative framework of review.  Chapter three (3) presents a descriptive model of 
the nature, scope and developments in review of CCMA awards by the courts.  
Chapter 4 discusses aspects of review with specific reference to the applicability or 
otherwise of PAJA in review of CCMA awards. Chapter five (5) offers concluding 
remarks.  
 
It is submitted that this study will show that PAJA is not applicable to arbitration 
awards and orders issued and made by the CCMA. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF REVIEW 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The early years of this century which saw the operation of the original Industrial 
Conciliations Act,7 was vastly accelerated with its metamorphosis into the Labour 
Relations Act,8 as amended, after the recommendations of the Wiehahn 
Commission.  The amendments to the 1956 Labour Relations Act provided the basis 
for most of what has followed.  It was against this backdrop that the Cheadle 
Commission began its work in 1994.  This culminated in the signing into law of the 
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) after thrashing it out through the National 
Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC).  The LRA of 1995 was 
implemented on 11 November 1996. 
 
The functional division between the Labour Court and the CCMA was effected by 
prescribing that certain disputes be referred to the Labour Court after conciliation, 
while others be referred to the CCMA.  The vertical division was effected by 
providing that the Labour Court can review decisions of the CCMA.  In formulating 
the vertical relationship between the Labour Court and the CCMA, the drafters of the 
LRA chose to borrow the procedure created by the Arbitration Act.  The result was 
section 145 of the LRA, which provides that awards issued by the CCMA, which are 
described in section 143 (1) as final and binding can be reviewed by the Labour 
Court if they are “defective”.  For purposes of that procedure, an award is defective if 
it has been procured by corruption, or if the arbitrating commissioner committed 
“misconduct in relation to the duties of the commissioner as an arbitrator” or “a gross 
irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings”, or “if the commissioner has 
exceeded his or her powers”. The option of appeal that existed under the 1956 LRA 
was reserved for litigants in the Labour Court. 
 
                                                 
7  Act 11 of 1924. 
8  Act 28 of 1956. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide a discussion on the legal framework in 
respect to review function of the Labour Court in respect of CCMA awards.  It 
includes the background, the interpretation of courts, embodiments of the Acts 
governing review, etc.  Therefore the chapter traces the historical, recent and current 
legislation dealing with review in South Africa.  It is significant to consider such 
legislation because it constitutes the cornerstone in regulating reviews of 
administrative actions.  Finally, there is an exploration of the latest constitutional 
court decisions, which have a direct bearing on this study. 
 
2.2 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
Arbitration awards by the CCMA are reviewable by the Labour Court in terms of 
section 145 of the LRA.  An award may be set aside if there is a defect in the 
arbitration proceedings in that the commissioner: 
 
(i) “committed misconduct in relation to his/her duties, 
(ii) committed a gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings; or 
(iii) exceeded his/her powers, 
(iv) or the award has been improperly obtained” 
 
(a) Misconduct in relation to the duties of an arbitrator9 
 
The concept of misconduct denotes some moral wrongdoing.  Gross negligence may 
indicate misconduct, as might a gross mistake of law or fact.  Misconduct certainly 
includes bias.  The test for bias is not only whether the presiding officer was in fact 
biased but also whether the conduct complained of would lead a reasonable litigant 
to doubt the impartiality of the presiding officer. In addition, a wide rage of defects in 
the conduct of proceedings has been held to constitute misconduct; for example: 
 
 misconstruction of evidence; 
 
 retracting permission of proceedings to be recorded; 
                                                 
9  S 145(2)(a)(i) of the LRA. 
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 failure to guide lay the parties on evidence to be presented or advise them of 
the need to call witnesses for proving documents; and 
 
 applying the criminal law test of proof of beyond reasonable doubt in arbitration 
proceedings. 
 
While the concept of “misconduct” is broad, clear evidence of the conduct 
complained of is essential.  Thus, “unsubstantiated claims of impropriety” against 
commissioners have been dismissed as bordering on contempt. 
 
(b) Gross irregularity in the conduct of the arbitration proceedings10 
 
Not all irregularity is “gross”.  The test for establishing gross irregularity is whether 
the irregularity was material and precluded a proper and fair hearing.  Gross 
irregularity may be patent or latent and may arise in relation to the establishment of 
the commissioner’s jurisdiction as well as the arbitration process itself.  Gross 
irregularity is not necessarily accompanied by bad faith.  If bad faith is present, it 
would also constitute misconduct [section 145(2)(a)(i)]. 
 
To establish reviewable irregularity, the applicant must show the irregularity had a 
material effect on the award.  
 
The following are examples of conduct that the Labour Court has regarded as 
grossly irregular: 
 
 granting legal representation inappropriately; 
 
 creating a reasonable impression of bias; 
 
 refusing to grant a postponement where the postponement was appropriate; 
 
                                                 
10  S 145(2)(a)(ii) of the LRA. 
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 conciliating a dispute at arbitration stage without the consent of both parties; 
 
 misconstruing jurisdiction; 
 
 failing to determine the dispute; 
 
 undermining the party’s right to lead evidence on the substantive issues in 
dispute; 
 
 refusing a party the right to cross-examine; 
 
 hearing evidence from a witness in the absence of both parties without their 
consent; 
 
 failing to advise a lay representative of the consequences of not challenging the 
other party’s evidence; 
 
 basing an award on documents not admitted as evidence; 
 
 making findings not justified on the evidence; 
 
 committing a material error of fact or gravely misunderstanding evidence. 
 
(c) Excess of power11 
 
A commissioner exceeds his or her powers, or acts ultra vires, by making an award 
which he or she did not have the power to make.  This may include failure to 
exercise a power or a discretion that ought to have been exercised.  
 
                                                 
11  S 145(2)(a)(iii) of the LRA. 
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Thus, a commissioner exceeds his or her powers by inter alia: 
 
 committing a material error of law, which may relate to proper characterisation 
of the dispute, or ignoring or misconstruing the appropriate statute or legal 
principles; 
 
 failing to apply the proper test to interpret relevant statutory or case law, 
including the law of evidence; 
 
 making findings that are not justified by the evidence; 
 
 determining issues which are not in dispute; and 
 
 failing to consider “appropriate material”. 
 
(d)  The award was improperly obtained12  
 
This category, as in the Arbitration Act, refers to the impropriety by a party unlike 
“misconduct” or “gross irregularity”, which are limited to the conduct of the 
commissioner.  In practice, section 145(2)(b) is therefore concerned primarily with 
the conduct of the successful party; for example, in resorting to bribery or fraudulent 
representations to obtain an award. 
 
(e) Appeal and review on the grounds of “justifiability” or “rationality” 
 
It has been suggested that the test of “justifiability” or “rationality” blurs the distinction 
between form (process) and content (merits) which is the quintessence of the 
distinction between appeal and review. 
 
Review on these extended grounds cannot avoid scrutiny of the substance of a 
decision which, according to the classical approach, could happen only on appeal.  
                                                 
12  S 145(2)(b) of the LRA. 
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In Carephone,13 Froneman DJP was careful to stress that the two processes remain 
conceptually distinct, appeal being concerned with the correctness of the result while 
review is confined to the manner in which a tribunal comes to its decision. 
 
(f) General power of review 
 
The Labour Court may review “the performance or purported performance of any 
function provided for in this Act on any grounds that are permissible in law”.14  Such 
review is applicable to all decisions and rulings of the CCMA other than arbitration 
awards. 
 
(g) Procedure on review 
 
Review procedure must be initiated within six weeks of service of an award15 or, if 
the alleged defect involves corruption, within six weeks of the discovery thereof.16  
Late application may be condoned on “good cause shown”.17  An application for 
review must allege specific grounds and facts in clear terms.  Generalised claims 
and unsubstantiated allegations will not suffice. 
 
(h)  Remedies on review 
 
The Labour Court may resolve a matter on review by making a final order and is 
likely to do so if the facts are not in dispute.18  However, the court will not readily 
substitute its decision for that of a commissioner.  If the record is not available the 
court cannot determine the dispute on the papers and may refer it back to the CCMA 
to be heard by a different commissioner.  The court may also remit a single issue, 
which had been omitted to be heard by the same commissioner. 
 
 
                                                 
13  Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO [2002] 2 BLLR 139 (LAC). 
14  S 158(10)(g) of the LRA. 
15  S 145(1)(a) of the LRA. 
16  S 145(1)(b) of the LRA. 
17  S 145(1A)] of the LRA. 
18  S 145(4) of the LRA. 
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
 
Except in the case of the most flagrant errors of judgment, the court will not lightly 
substitute its views for that of a commissioner on such subjective issues as whether 
or not a dismissal was appropriate for a particular offence. 
 
When commissioners exceed the constitutional restraints on their powers during 
arbitration, their conduct can be reviewed by the Labour Court under section 145 of 
the LRA.  Section 145 must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the 
constitution. 
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CHAPTER 3 
NATURE, SCOPE AND DEVELOPMENT OF REVIEW 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The grounds set out in section 145 are the only basis in the LRA for setting aside 
awards issued by CCMA commissioners.  Simple as they may seem, they have 
vexed the judges of the labour and labour appeal courts since the first review 
application was launched in 1997.19 
 
The main question was whether the court was bound by the interpretations placed by 
the former Supreme Court on the like provisions of section 33 of the Arbitration Act.20  
This was an important question, because the Supreme Court strongly emphasised 
the fact that the parties to private arbitration had agreed to take that route and thus, 
in its view, should put up with more eccentricity - and even ineptness – on the part of 
arbitrators than would be expected of them had they been subject to some 
compulsory procedure.  “Misconduct” and “gross irregularity” were, therefore, read 
literally, and were taken to exclude bona fide mistakes. 
 
That approach was acceptable in the context of a consensual regime.  However, 
arbitration by the CCMA is not voluntary – at least, in most instances – for 
employers.  Apart from its organisational similarity to IMSSA and the terminology in 
the Act, the CCMA is a statutory institution with considerable powers over citizens in 
their capacities as employees or employers.  As such the CCMA is subject to the 
constitution and to the common law applicable administrative tribunals. 
 
Earlier uncertainty as to whether the Labour Court could also review arbitration 
awards under its general or “broader” power of review [section 158(1)(g)] was 
resolved by the Labour Appeal Court in Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO21 where it 
was held that review of CCMA arbitration is limited to the grounds set out in section 
145 of the LRA.  In that judgment, Froneman DJP ruled that the only avenue for 
                                                 
19  Edgars Stores Ltd v Director CCMA [1998] 1 BLLR 34 (LC). 
20  Act 42 of 1965. 
21  [1998] 11 BLLR 1093 (LAC). 
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review was section 145, but that, because the CCMA was an administrative tribunal, 
it was subject to the wider constitutional ground of “justifiability”.  Judge Froneman 
summarised the requirements for an award prescribed by the LRA, at paragraph 20, 
as follows: 
 
“The constitutional imperatives for compulsory arbitration under the LRA are thus 
that the process must be fair and equitable, that the arbitrator must be impartial 
and unbiased, that the proceedings must be lawful and procedurally fair, that the 
reasons for the award must be given publicly and in writing, that the award must 
be justifiable in terms of those reasons and that it must be consistent with the 
fundamental right to fair labour practices.” 
 
At paragraph 21 in the judgment, Froneman DJP added: 
 
“But it would be wrong to read into [section 33 of the constitution] an attempt to 
abolish the distinction between review and appeal.  According to the New 
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary ‘justifiable’ means ‘able to be legally or morally 
justifiable, able to be shown to be just, reasonable, or correct; defensible’.  It 
does not mean ‘just’, ‘justified’ or ‘correct’.  On its plain meaning the use of the 
word ‘justifiable’ does not ask for the obliteration between review and appeal.  
Neither does the LRA itself; it makes a very clear distinction between reviews 
and appeals.” 
 
The LAC also found, however, that the scope of review under this section is not 
confined to process as with the review of private arbitration.  Although there is a 
fundamental difference between review and appeal, a public administrative agency 
which exercises state functions has a constitutional duty to dispense administrative 
action which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair and justifiable in relation to 
the reasons given for it [section 33 and schedule 6 item 23(b) of the Constitution].  
The underlying standard of review in terms of section 145, therefore, is whether 
there is “a rational objective basis justifying the connection made by the 
administrative decision maker [that is, the CCMA commissioner] between the 
material properly available to him and the conclusion he or she eventually arrived at”. 
 
In Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO,22 the Labour Appeal Court based 
itself on the principle that decisions taken in the exercise of public power must be 
rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given.  The court went on 
to hold, at paragraph 10, as follows: 
                                                 
22  [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC). 
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“Although the terms “justifiable” and “rational” may not, strictly speaking, be 
synonymous, they bear a sufficiently similar meaning to justify the conclusion 
that rationality can be said to be accommodated within the concept of justifiability 
as used in Carephone. In this regard I am satisfied that a decision that is 
justifiable cannot be said to be irrational and a decision that is irrational cannot 
be said to be justifiable.” 
 
The effect is that the criterion established in Carephone23 stands alongside that in 
Ramdaw.24  These “extended grounds of review”, however, have not superseded the 
grounds for review set out in section 145 or created a new discreet test.  Rather, 
section 145 has been “read up” for constitutional consistency.  The Labour Court 
remains obliged to make a finding on section 145 and cannot ignore its specific 
provisions in favour of a new abstraction of substantive rationality. 
 
On the strength of the above, it can be argued the weight of authority suggests that the 
court should make a finding that an award is defective on one of the specified grounds, or on 
the grounds set out in Carephone and Ramdaw, before an award is set aside. Not doing so, 
it is submitted, creates a situation that is practically indistinguishable from conducting a 
review in terms of section 158 91)(g) which the Labour Appeal Court, in the cases 
mentioned above, categorically ruled against. 
 
What was meant by the phrase “justifiable in terms of the reasons given” next 
received the attention of the Labour Appeal Court in County Fair Foods (Pty) Ltd v 
CCMA.25  In that case Kroon JA expressed doubt about whether Froneman DJP had 
correctly captured the distinction between review and appeal.  He wrote, at 
paragraph 10: 
 
“If the word ‘correct’ were excised from those meanings and the remainder were 
contrasted simply with the word ‘correct’ there would be no quarrel with the 
distinction drawn. I am not convinced, however, of the correctness, in the 
present context, of including within the meanings of ‘justifiable’ that of ‘able to be 
shown to be correct’ and of contrasting ‘justifiable’ with ‘just’ or justified’. The 
question may in due course have to be revisited.”  
 
                                                 
23  Ibid. 
24  Ibid. 
25  [1999] 11 BLLR 1117 (LAC). 
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The answer to the semantic issue lies in a further passage from the Carephone 
judgment that Kroon JA found acceptable.  It reads, at paragraph 10: 
 
“In determining whether administrative action is justifiable in terms of the 
reasons given for it, value judgments will have to be made which will, almost 
inevitably, involve the consideration of the ‘merits’ of the matter in some way or 
another. As long as the judge determining this issue is aware that he or she 
enters the merits not in order to substitute his/her own opinion on the 
correctness thereof, but to determine whether the outcome is rationally 
justifiable, the process will be in order.” 
 
However, County Fair raised deeper issues, which surfaced in Toyota South Africa 
Motors v Radebe.26  The facts in both cases were similar, except that County Fair 
involved an assault by an employee on his estranged girlfriend, while Toyota 
involved fraud by the employee against his employer.  The employee in Toyota had 
an abysmal safety record with the car he leased from the company.  After Mr 
Radebe had crashed it several times, the company deprived him of the lease benefit 
for a period.  No sooner had that benefit been restored than he had another 
accident. Rather than own up, Radebe abandoned the car, keys in the ignition, in a 
public parking lot, and told the police and the company that it had been hijacked.  
The ruse was later discovered by the company and Radebe was dismissed. 
 
The arbitrating commissioner held that Radebe’s misconduct, though gross, did not, 
in the circumstances justify dismissal. Influenced primarily by Radebe’s 13 years’ 
service without a disciplinary record, his contribution and the fact that his supervisor 
had pleaded for leniency at the disciplinary hearing, the commissioner held: 
 
“However, it is in my view critical for sound labour relations within the 
respondent’s organisation that the applicant should be appropriately disciplined 
for his acts of gross dishonesty. Nevertheless, I do believe that there is an 
opportunity for disciplinary action short of dismissal to ensure that the 
respondent is reasonably protected from the probability of future similar acts of 
dishonesty on the part of other employees as a result of the outcome of this 
case. I therefore find that the appropriate disciplinary sanction in this case is re-
employment rather than reinstatement, which represents a suspension without 
pay, together with a final warning to the applicant in respect of dishonesty.” 
 
                                                 
26  [2000] 3 BLLR 243 (LAC). 
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Few examples could better illustrate the substitution by a commissioner of his own 
opinion for that of the employer, which is what the majority judgment in County Fair 
precludes.  The Labour Appeal Court when called upon to intervene set aside this 
award, following the Labour Court reluctance to interfere with the commissioner’s 
award. 
 
3.2 THE INTRODUCTION OF PAJA IN REVIEW OF CCMA AWARDS 
 
As if the jurisdictional puzzle created by the LRA was not complex enough, the 
legislature added another piece with the PAJA.  The PAJA is meant to give statutory 
flesh to the bones of the administrative justice provisions in section 23 of the 
Constitution.  The PAJA sets out inter alia the grounds on which administrative acts 
may be reviewed, and compels administrative tribunals and organs to provide 
reasons for their decisions. 
 
There are a number of points at which the provisions of the PAJA and those of the 
LRA intersect.  The PAJA regulates administrative action.  This means, essentially, 
the conduct of statutory organs.  The LRA regulates the actions of the State in its 
capacity as employer.  Many decisions taken by the State in its capacity as employer 
constitute administrative action.  Section 157(2) of the LRA confers concurrent 
jurisdiction on the labour and high courts in cases involving the state as employer, 
and further that such cases could be resolved either in the Labour Court under the 
LRA or EEA, or in the high court under the common law or PAJA. 
 
The overlap between the PAJA and the LRA in the context of review was noted by 
the Labour Appeal Court in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Ramdaw NO27 in which 
Zondo JP said obiter and tentatively, at paragraph 29: 
 
“Even though the view expressed by this Court in Carephone that the making of 
an arbitration award by a CCMA commissioner constitutes an administrative 
action might not be correct, it seems to me that the definitions of ‘administrative 
action’ and of ’decision’ in section 1 of the PAJA may be wide enough to include 
it.  I say this despite the reference in the definition of ‘decision’ to a decision ‘of 
an administrative nature’.  It is not necessary to express a final view on this issue 
in this matter. It is sufficient, if it appears that the PAJA may well be applicable to 
                                                 
27  [2001] 9 BLLR 1011 (LAC). 
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the making of an arbitration award by the CCMA commissioner because the 
question that has arisen in this matter is whether or not there is a warrant to 
reconsider the decision of this Court in Carephone.”  
 
The Judge President referred to Carephone (Pty) Ltd v Marcus NO28 because the 
central issue in Shoprite Checkers was whether Carephone was correct.  In 
Carephone Froneman DJP (as he then was), writing for the unanimous court, held 
that the CCMA is a statutory body and that its decisions and awards were 
accordingly reviewable according to “justifiability” standard prescribed by the interim 
constitution. In Shoprite Checkers, Zondo JP observed that if the PAJA applied to 
arbitration awards by CCMA commissioner, section 6 of that Act would be applicable 
to reviews.  That section provides that an administrative action may be reviewed if it 
is “procedurally unfair”, if the action is not rationally connected to the information 
before the administrator, or the reason given for it by the administrator.  If, therefore 
the PAJA applied to CCMA awards, such awards must be rationally connected to the 
reasons given for them.  This is precisely what the LAC said in Carephone, although 
in that case the court used the “justifiable” because that was the word used in the 
administrative justice provision of the interim constitution, which was in force at the 
time. 
 
Shoprite Checkers therefore left open the question whether the PAJA does in fact 
apply to decisions and awards of the CCMA.  That question surfaced in somewhat 
curious circumstances in PSA obo Haschke v MEC for Agriculture.29  In that case, 
the applicants sought to set aside a decision by a CCMA commissioner not to 
condone the late referral of a dispute on the basis that the commissioner had not 
provided reasons for her decision, as required by the PAJA.  The MEC contended in 
limine that insofar as the applicant based their case on the PAJA, the application 
was premature because in terms of that Act applicants are first required to request 
reasons, which they had not yet done.  The court requested counsel to prepare 
argument on these points, and adjourned overnight.  The next day the respondent’s 
counsel, “found that he was arguing against himself” and withdrew the point in 
limine.  This left the court with the task of determining whether the commissioner’s 
decision was reviewable in terms of section 145 of the LRA.  However, the judge felt 
                                                 
28  [2002] 2 BLLR 139 (LAC). 
29  [2004] 8 BLLR 822 (LC). 
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that the question of whether the PAJA applies to labour matters was important 
enough to warrant comment.  
 
Pillay J noted that the debate over the grounds of review of CCMA awards began 
with the judgment in Carephone.  Pillay J said that the Constitution has radically 
altered the situation.  The rights to fair labour practices are now entrenched as 
distinct rights.  Subsequently, labour rights were specifically codified in the LRA,30 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act31 (BCEA) and the Employment Equity Act32 
(EEA).  Other labour-related statutes (the Public Service Act 199433, the South 
African Police Service Act34 68 of 1995 and the Employment of Educators’ Act 76 of 
199835 have also been amended to regulate labour rights in the public sector.  These 
Acts are all specifically designed to give expression to the constitutional right to fair 
labour practices.  The LRA and the EEA expressly provide that they shall take 
precedence over any other laws save the constitution.  Thus, to the extent that the 
PAJA conflicts with them, the PAJA must give way.  Furthermore, to the extent that 
the labour laws do not protect labour rights, recourse must be had directly to the 
constitutional right to fair labour practices.  Given this exclusive framework of labour 
laws, said Pillay, there is no need to rely any longer on administrative law in labour 
matters. 
 
In any event, according to the judge, arbitration is not an administrative act. It may 
have characteristics common to “adjudicative administrative acts” but arbitration is 
essentially an alternative to litigation.  Simply because the arbitrator acts under the 
auspices of an administrative organ does not alter arbitration’s essential character.  It 
remains arbitration.  PAJA cannot therefore apply to arbitrations. It follows that 
arbitration proceedings must be reviewed under section 145 of the LRA. 
 
                                                 
30  Ibid.  
31  Act 75 of 1997. 
32  Act 55 of 1998. 
33  Act 105 of 1994. 
34  Act 68 of 1995. 
35  Act 76 of 1998. 
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Pillay AJ could discern no difference between rulings and arbitrations.  She said, at 
paragraph 21: 
 
“The nature and essential content of the process of issuing rulings are similar to 
arbitration. As such, they too do not amount to administrative action.  If this were 
so, then the anomaly that arises is that a ruling made in the course of arbitration 
and which finds itself as one of the grounds of review of an award is itself tested 
against section 145, whereas other rulings that are made outside arbitration 
[such as rulings on condonation] are tested against section 158 (1)(g).” 
 
The judge was unable to see why different tests should apply to awards and rulings 
made outside arbitration. If different tests were to apply, a further anomaly would 
arise: since no rules have yet been made for the Labour Court under the PAJA, the 
Labour Court is unable to apply the PAJA.  A litigant wishing to attack a purely 
administrative ruling by the CCMA and it seems, bargaining councils, on the grounds 
set out in the PAJA, would then have to approach the High Court, which would then 
apply a different test to that applied by the Labour Court.  This, said the judge, would 
raise the spectre of another “unintended consequence” of the PAJA: the splitting of 
jurisdiction between the Labour Court and the High Court over labour issues. 
 
But the prospect of split jurisdiction (which already exists) is not in itself sufficient to 
warrant the conclusion that the PAJA does not apply to acts of the CCMA.  Pillay J 
recognised this, as did the LAC in Shoprite and the Labour Court in Basson v 
Provincial Commissioner (Eastern Cape), Department of Correctional Services36 and 
National Employers Forum v Minister of Labour.37  But, said the judge, the provisions 
of the PAJA itself indicate that a conflict exists between the PAJA and labour 
legislation.  This clash requires that the former should give way to the latter to the 
extent of such conflict. 
 
In the first place, Pillay J noted that the procedures for judicial review under the 
PAJA clash with those prescribed in the LRA.  Under the LRA, review must be 
launched within six weeks of the date on which an award is issued; litigants relying 
on the PAJA have 90 days within which to request reasons for an administrator’s 
action.  The administrator has a further 90 days to furnish reasons.  The PAJA 
                                                 
36  [2003] 4 BLLR 341 (LC). 
37  (2003) 24 ILJ 954 (LC). 
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requires that internal remedies be exhausted before a court is approached; under the 
LRA, an internal appeal is not required before the court permits access.  
Furthermore, the LRA prescribes specific remedies for dismissal; the PAJA permits a 
court to direct the administrator to act, as the court deems necessary. 
 
Secondly, said Pillay J, the clash between the PAJA and labour laws becomes 
evident in the sphere of public sector authorities not to appoint a particular applicant 
for employment on the grounds of affirmative action or where public sector 
employees are suspended without hearings? At first glance, people affected by such 
decisions seem to have the choice between relying on the LRA in the Labour Court 
and invoking the PAJA in the High Court. But, said the judge, this choice does not 
withstand more careful reflection. She said, at paragraph 41, 
 
“Exercising a choice between the PAJA and labour law is linear. Labour law is 
polycentric.  Affirmative action is collectively bargained as a planned progression 
towards employment equity.  Disputes arising from it must be channelled 
through the carefully constructed procedure of conciliation followed, if necessary, 
by adjudication.  Conciliation seeks to address all interests as opposed to 
determining rights. Insofar as rights have to be determined by adjudication, this 
is accomplished by specialists who must give effect to the primary objectives of 
the labour laws. If the claim succeeds should, as a matter of policy, such 
individual action be allowed to trump collectively bargained decisions?” 
 
According to the judge, the objectives of the LRA call for a negative answer to her 
question. If labour decisions were to be reviewable under the PAJA, the implications 
for collective bargaining and effective dispute resolution would be “catastrophic”.  Not 
only that; the rights of other parties would be adversely affected.  Employers, in 
particular, have a right to assume that they can act in terms of labour legislation and 
that labour and employment disputes will be resolved within the time limits 
prescribed by labour legislation.  If the PAJA were to be applied in labour matters, 
employers would find themselves confronted with different time limits and different 
standards of conduct. 
 
However, according to Pillay J, the most drastic difference between PAJA and the 
LRA lies in the different standards of review required by the two acts. At paragraph 
28 she observed that: 
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“The grounds of review under section 145 are misconduct by the arbitrator, 
commission of a gross irregularity, acting ultra vires and improperly obtaining an 
award.  The PAJA grounds of review are a complete codification of the common-
law grounds of review.  Any grounds not specifically mentioned has been 
captured in the catch-phrase that empowers a court to review action that is 
otherwise unconstitutional or unlawful.  Such a comprehensive codification can 
encourage a mechanical checklist mentality when reviewing awards.” 
 
Pillay observed that not only does PAJA encourage a mechanistic approach; it also 
urges a court to delve into the merits of administrative action.  This is because, as 
the PAJA requires and the Constitutional Court has observed (see Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association of SA; In Re Ex parte Application of the President of the 
RSA38 that lawful and fair administrative action must be rational.  The result, said 
Pillay J, at paragraph 34, would be that: 
 
“If PAJA applies to labour law decisions it could widen the door that Carephone 
opened to the risk of judges substituting their decisions for those with which they 
simply do not agree. If that happens then the objectives of speed and finality of 
dispute resolution will be thwarted.” 
 
And, at paragraph 35,further: 
“To subject CCMA adjudication to a constitutional test for just administrative 
action could not only broaden the grounds of review and blur the distinction 
between appeal and review even further but also cause parallel streams of 
jurisprudence to develop; one for private and bargaining council adjudication and 
another for CCMA adjudication; one for high court decisions, another for labour 
law decisions.” 
 
3.3 CONCLUSION 
 
It is accordingly submitted that the debate over the grounds of review of CCMA 
awards began with the judgment in Carephone.  The Constitution has, however, 
radically altered the situation.  The rights to fair labour practices are now entrenched 
as clearly discernible rights.  Subsequently, labour rights were specifically codified in 
the LRA and other labour legislation.  These Acts are all specifically designed to give 
expression to the constitutional right to fair labour practices.  The LRA and the EEA 
expressly provide that they shall take precedence over any other laws save the 
Constitution.  Thus, to the extent that the PAJA conflicts with them, the PAJA must 
give way. 
                                                 
38  2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC). 
 20  
CHAPTER 4 
APPLICABILITY OR OTHERWISE OF THE PROMOTION OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE ACT (PAJA) IN REVIEW PROCEEDINGS 
 
4.1 THE PAJA OR THE LRA? 
 
The SCA found that PAJA applies.  It took the view that because PAJA was the 
national legislation passed to give effect to the constitutional right to just 
administrative action, was required to “cover the field”39 and purported to do so, it 
applied to CCMA awards by commissioners.   
 
In this regard it relied on decisions of the Constitutional Court in New Clicks40 and 
Bato Star.41  It did not examine the nature of a Commissioner’s function by reference 
to section 33 of the Constitution, nor did it explore whether PAJA provided an 
exclusive statutory basis for the review of all administrative decisions. 
 
In President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 
the following appears, at paragraph 141: 
 
“In s 33 the adjective ‘administrative’ not ‘executive’ is used to qualify ‘action’.  
This suggests that the test for determining whether conduct constitutes 
‘administrative action’ is not the question whether the action concerned is 
performed by a member of the executive arm of government.  What matters is 
not so much the functionary as the function.  The question is whether the task 
itself is administrative or not.” 
 
In form, characteristics and functions, administrative tribunals straddle a wide 
spectrum. At one end they implement or give effect to policy or to legislation.  At the 
other, some tribunals resemble courts of law.  The old Industrial Court established in 
terms of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956, although performing functions similar 
                                                 
39  Minister of Health v New Clicks SA (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign and Innovative 
Medicines SA as Amici Curiae) 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
40  Ibid. 
41  Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 2004 (7) BCLR 687 
2004 (4) SA 490 (CC). 
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to that of a court of law, was regarded as administrative in nature.  In this regard, the 
Appellate Division said the following: 
 
“An administrative body, although operating as such, may nevertheless in the 
discharge of its duties function as if it were a court of law performing what may 
be described as judicial functions, without negating its identity as an 
administrative body and becoming a court of law.” 
 
The Amnesty Committee, established in terms of the Promotion of National Unity 
and Reconciliation Act,42 was empowered to conduct hearings in relation to 
applications for amnesty.  Its proceedings were similar to those of a court of law.  
Nevertheless, it was an administrative body. 
 
There are similarities between CCMA arbitrations and proceedings before a court of 
law.  Section 138(2) of the LRA provides for the manner of adducing evidence, the 
questioning of witnesses and concluding arguments.  Section 142 gives the 
commissioner powers of subpoena.  Section 142(8) provides for contempt 
proceedings in the Labour Court in the event that a party fails to comply with an 
award that orders the performance of an act other than the payment of money.  
Section 143(1) of the LRA provides that an award is final and binding and may be 
enforced as though it were an order of the Labour Court.  A commissioner may make 
an order for payment of costs in terms of section 138(10) of the LRA. 
 
However, there are significant differences.  The CCMA is not a court of law.  A 
commissioner is empowered in terms of section 138(1) to conduct the arbitration in a 
manner he or she considerers appropriate in order to determine the dispute fairly 
and quickly, but with the minimum of legal formalities.  There is no blanket right to 
legal representation.  The CCMA does not follow a system of binding precedents. 
Commissioners do not have the same security of tenure as judicial officers. 
 
Commenting on the status of the CCMA, Brassey states as follows: 
 
“Unlike the labour court, it enjoys none of the status of a court of law and so has 
no judicial authority within the contemplation of the constitution.  It is an 
administrative tribunal in the same way as the industrial court was and, being an 
                                                 
42  Act 34 of 1995. 
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organ of state under s 239 of the constitution, is directly bound by the Bill of 
Rights.  It is also subject to the basic values and principles governing public 
administration.”  
 
Currie and De Waal state: 
 
“The CCMA is not a branch of the judiciary and does not exercise judicial power.  
Rather, the exercise of the compulsory arbitration power is an exercise of public 
power of an administrative (‘governmental’) nature.  The arbitration power is 
designed to fulfil the primary goal of the Act which is to promote labour peace by 
the effective settlement of disputes.  It does so with an element of compulsion, 
corresponding to the traditional government/governed relationship.” 
 
Compulsory arbitrations in terms of the LRA are different from private arbitrations. 
CCMA commissioners exercise public power which impacts on the parties before 
them. In the language of the pre-constitutional administrative law order, it would have 
been described as an administrative body exercising a quasi-judicial function.  
 
On the basis of the above, the honourable acting judge Navsa, concluded that a 
Commissioner conducting CCMA arbitration is performing an administrative function. 
 
Section 33(3) of the constitution provides that national legislation must be enacted to 
give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair.  Section 145 of the LRA constitutes national legislation in respect of 
“administrative action” within the specialised labour law sphere.  Of course, section 
145 has to meet the requirements of section 33(1) of the Constitution ie it has to 
provide for administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  
 
The LRA, including section 145, was in place at the time that the Constitution came 
into force.  Section 33(3) read with item 23(2) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution 
contemplates that the national legislation referred to in section 33 of the Constitution 
is to be enacted in the future.  It is clear that what was envisaged was legislation of 
general application.  PAJA was the resultant legislation.  The definition of 
administrative action in PAJA is extensive and intended to “cover the field”. 
 
Nothing in section 33 of the Constitution precludes specialised legislative regulation 
of administrative action such as section 145 of the LRA alongside general legislation 
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such as PAJA.  Of course, any legislation giving effect to section 33 must comply 
with its prescripts. 
 
In Bato Star43 the following appears, at paragraph 25: 
 
“The provisions of s 6 divulge a clear purpose to codify the grounds of judicial 
review of administrative action as defined in PAJA.  The cause of action for the 
judicial review of administrative action now ordinarily arises from PAJA, not from 
the common law as in the past.  And the authority of PAJA to ground such 
causes of action rests squarely on the constitution.  It is not necessary to 
consider here causes of action for judicial review of administrative action that do 
not fall within the scope of PAJA.  As PAJA gives effect to s 33 of the 
constitution, matters relating to the interpretation and application of PAJA will of 
course be constitutional matters.” 
 
PAJA is a codification of the common law grounds of review.  It is apparent, though, 
that it is not regarded as the exclusive legislative basis of review. 
 
It is against this background that the following dictum in New Clicks (relying on Bato 
Star) is to be understood, at paragraph 95: 
 
“PAJA is the national legislation that was passed to give effect to the rights 
contained in s 33.  It was clearly intended to be, and in substance is, a 
codification of these rights. It was required to cover the field and purports to do 
so.” 
 
This does not in any way detract from the reservation contained in the quoted dictum 
from Bato Star. 
 
The Constitutional Court, through Navsa, found that arbitration by a commissioner is 
administrative action.  Does this mean that review provisions of PAJA are 
automatically applicable in CCMA arbitration reviews?  
 
To answer this question it is necessary first to deal with the LRA and its applicable 
provisions in relation to PAJA.  The LRA is a specialised negotiated national 
legislation giving effect to the right to fair labour practices.  The Ministerial Task 
Team responsible for the drafting of the Bill that led to the LRA was tasked, amongst 
                                                 
43  See fn 41. 
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other things, to “provide simple procedures for the resolution of disputes through 
statutory conciliation, mediation and arbitration and the licensing of independent 
alternative dispute resolution services”.44  The task team was tasked to “provide a 
system of labour courts to determine disputes of right in a way that would be 
accessible, speedy and inexpensive, with only one tier of appeal”.  NEDLAC referred 
the Draft Bill to Cabinet recommending its adoption subject to agreed amendments.  
Section 145 was purposefully designed as was the entire dispute resolution 
framework of the LRA. 
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal was of the view that the only tension in relation to the 
importation of PAJA was the difference in time-scales in relation to reviews under 
section 145 of the LRA and PAJA.  This difference is but one symptom of a lack of 
cohesion between provisions of the LRA and PAJA. 
 
Section 157(1) of the LRA provides that, subject to the Constitution and except 
where the LRA provides otherwise, the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction.  
Section 157(2) provides that the Labour Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the 
High Court in respect of any alleged or threatened infringement of any right in the 
Constitution and arising, inter alia, from employment and labour relations.  High 
courts will of course always have jurisdiction where a fundamental right is pertinently 
implicated in the labour relations field, as for example, when a union might seek to 
interdict an employment practice that is obviously racist.  This of course, does not 
mean that in the ordinary course of reviewing decisions of CCMA commissioners 
concerning unfair labour practices, the Labour Court does not enjoy exclusive 
jurisdiction. 
 
If PAJA were to apply, section 6 thereof would not allow for such exclusivity and 
would enable the High Court to review CCMA arbitrations.  This would mean that the 
High Court would have concurrent jurisdiction with the Labour Court.  This negates 
the intended exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court and provides a platform for 
forum shopping. 
 
                                                 
44  Explanatory Memorandum at 279. 
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The powers of the Labour Court set out in section 158 of the LRA differ significantly 
from the powers of a court set out in section 8 of PAJA.  The powers of the Labour 
Court are directed at remedying a wrong and, in the spirit of the LRA, at providing 
finality speedily.  If an application in the normal course for the review of 
administrative action succeeds, an applicant is usually entitled to no more than the 
setting aside of the impugned decision and its remittal to the decision-maker to apply 
his or her mind afresh.  Section 8(1)(c)(ii) of PAJA provides that only in exceptional 
cases may a court substitute the administrative decision or correct a defect resulting 
from the administrative action.  This is a significant difference between the LRA and 
PAJA. 
 
All of this explains why section 210 of the LRA was enacted, and why it was not 
amended or repealed by PAJA.  Section 210 of the LRA provides as follows: 
 
“If any conflict, relating to the matters dealt with in this Act, arises between this 
Act and the provisions of any other law save the Constitution or any Act 
expressly amending this Act, the provisions of this Act will prevail.” 
 
The State in both its executive and legislative arms was involved in finalising the 
LRA together with persons representing business, labour and community interests.  
Section 210 is unsurprising.  The main protagonists in industrial relations, having 
negotiated the terms of the legislation, were not likely to countenance any non-
agreed intrusions.  This is particularly so in relation to the method and manner of 
determining disputes. 
 
For more than a century courts have applied the principle that general legislation, 
unless specifically indicated does not derogate from special legislation.  Lord 
Hobhouse delivering the judgment of the Privy Council in Barker v Edger stated the 
following: 
 
“When the Legislature has given its attention to a separate subject, and made 
provision for it, the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not 
intended to interfere with the special provision unless it manifests that intention 
very clearly.  Each enactment must be construed in that respect according to its 
own subject-matter and its own terms …  It would require a very clear 
expression of the mind of the Legislature before we should impute to it the 
intention of destroying the foundation of the work which it had initiated some four 
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years before, and to which the Court has ever since been assiduously 
addressing itself.”45 
 
In R v Gwantshu,46 after citing Barker with approval, the court quoted the following 
passage from Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes:47 
 
“Where general words in a later Act are capable of reasonable and sensible 
application without extending to subjects specially dealt with, by earlier 
legislation, that earlier and special legislation is not to be held indirectly … 
altered … merely by force of such general words, without any indication or 
particular intention to do so.” 
 
The legislature had knowledge of section 210 of the LRA and deliberately decided 
not to repeal that section or section 145 of the LRA.  Moreover, it resulted from 
intense negotiations that led to the enactment of the LRA.  This is an appropriate 
case for the application of the principle that specialised provisions trump general 
provisions. 
 
For the reasons set out above, the SCA was found to have erred in holding that 
PAJA applied to arbitration awards in terms of the LRA. 
 
4.2  DOES PAJA APPLY IN DISPUTES INVOLVING PUBLIC SECTOR 
EMPLOYEES? 
 
One of the unintended consequences of the provisions of section 157(2) has been 
that employees in the public sector consider themselves as having more than one 
cause of action.  Public sector employees normally allege that when a State 
employer dismisses them, such conduct amounts to the exercise of public power and 
therefore constitutes administrative action.  Much store is placed by the decision in 
Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile48 and its progeny, which held that the dismissal of 
a public sector employee is an exercise of public power. Public sector employees 
                                                 
45  754. 
46  R v Gwantshu 1931 EDI 29. 
47  Bridgman (ed) Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes 7th ed (1929) at 153.  See also Doctors 
for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC); 2006 (12) 
BCLR 1399 (CC) at para 49 and 1420H-1421B; Sasol Synthetic Fuels (Pty) Ltd v Lambert 2002 
(2) SA 21 (SCA) at para 17; Consolidated Employers Medical Aid Society v Leveton 1999 (2) 
SA 32 (SCA) at 40I-41B; Khumalo v Director-General of Co-operation and Development 1991 
(1) SA 158 (A) at 164C-165D. 
48  1991 (1) SA 21 (A) at 34B-D; (1991) 12 ILJ 259 (A) at 270G. 
 27  
contend therefore that this implicates the constitutional right to just administrative 
action in section 33 of the Constitution.  This, they argue, entitles them to approach 
the High Court under section 157(2) of the LRA. But do they have more than one 
cause of action? 
 
4.3 THE SCA JUDGMENT: CHIRWA v TRANSNET49 
 
The argument that the decision by Transnet to dismiss Ms Chirwa (Chirwa), gave 
rise to two causes of action is premised on the assumption that the dismissal of a 
public sector employee constitutes administrative action.  Judicial opinion on this 
issue is not harmonious.  The debate reduces itself to how powers exercised by a 
public entity in its employment relations ought to be characterised.  One school of 
thought holds the view that all employment relationships should be governed by 
labour law, including the right to fair labour practices in section 23 of the Constitution 
to the exclusion of administrative law, PAJA and the right to just administrative action 
in section 33.  This school of thought has been adopted in a number of cases.50  The 
other school of thought holds the view that the exercise of public power inevitably 
attracts both administrative law and labour law with the result that public sector 
employees have remedies under both branches of law.  This approach too has been 
adopted in several cases.51 
                                                 
49  Transnet Ltd v Chirwa [2007] 1 BLLR 10 (SCA). 
50  See Western Cape Workers Association v Minister of Labour [2006] 1 BLLR 79 (LC) at para 10 
(PAJA is not applicable to labour disputes); Hlope v Minister of Safety and Security [2006] 3 
BLLR 297 (LC) at para 10 (transfer of employees does not constitute administrative action); 
Greyvenstein v Kommissaris van die SA Inkomste Diens (2005) 26 ILJ 1395 (T) at 1402F-G 
(instituting disciplinary proceedings is not an exercise of public power); Louw v SA Rail 
Commuter Corporation Ltd (2005) 26 ILJ 1960 (W) at paras 16-18 (decision to dismiss not 
governed by PAJA); SA Police Union v National Commissioner of the SA Police Service (2005) 
26 ILJ 2403 (LC); [2006] 1 BLLR 42 (LC); (SA Police Union) at paras 50-51 (setting the working 
hours of police officers does not constitute administrative action); and Public Servants 
Association on behalf of Haschke v MEC for Agriculture (2004) 25 ILJ 1750 (LC) (Public 
Servants Association) at paras 11-12, where Pillay J held that labour law is not administrative 
law.  In addition, she noted that historically administrative law had been used to advance labour 
rights where labour laws were considered to be inadequate. 
51  See Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services (2006) 27 ILJ 555 
(E); [2006] 4 BLLR 385 (E) (POPCRU) at para 64 (the decision to dismiss correctional service 
employees constitutes administrative action); Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate 
Services, Department of Correctional Services [2006] 10 BLLR 960 (LC) at paras 56-58 and 64 
(transfer of correctional services employee constitutes administrative action); Nell v Minister of 
Justice & Constitutional Development [2006] 7 BLLR 716 (T) at para 23 (purported dismissal 
was administrative action in terms of PAJA); Johannesburg Municipal Pension Fund v City of 
Johannesburg 2005 (6) SA 273 (W) at para 14 (a decision to terminate certain pension funds 
amounted to administrative action under PAJA); Mbayeka above n 8 at para 29 (failure to hear 
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What ultimately divides these schools of thought is a disagreement over whether the 
decision of a public entity to dismiss an employee should be characterised as the 
exercise of public power.  The views expressed by members of the SCA in the 
Transnet case reflect this disagreement.  It will be convenient, first, to consider these 
two schools of thought; then to identify the principles laid down in President of the 
Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union (SARFU)52 on what 
constitutes administrative action; and ultimately, to apply those principles – retooled 
insofar as may be necessary, to the facts of the Transnet case before the SCA. 
 
Mthiyane JA held that the nature of the conduct involved in that case is the 
termination of a contract of employment which is based on a contract.  The conduct 
of Transnet in terminating the employment contract did not therefore involve the 
exercise of public power or performance of a public function in terms of some 
legislation as required by PAJA.53  He reasoned that the mere fact that Transnet is 
an organ of State “does not impart a public law character to its employment contract 
with the applicant”.54  Its power to dismiss is not found in legislation but in the 
employment contract between it and the applicant.  When Transnet dismissed the 
applicant it “did not act as a public authority but simply in its capacity as employer”.55  
He further reasoned that “ordinarily” the employment contract has no public element 
and is not governed by administrative law.  He held that the applicant was protected 
by the provisions of the LRA.56  He concluded that the conduct of Transnet in 
dismissing the applicant did not therefore constitute administrative action as defined 
in PAJA nor did it violate Chirwa’s rights under section 33 of the Constitution.57 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
employees before suspending them was unconstitutional administrative action) and Simela v 
MEC for Education, Province of the Eastern Cape [2001] 9 BLLR 1085 (LC) at paras 42 and 59 
(decision to transfer an employee without consultation amounted to both an unfair labour 
practice and unjust administrative action). 
52  2000 (1) SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) at para 141. 
53  Above n 3 at paras 14-15. 
54  Para 15. 
55  Ibid. 
56  Ibid. 
57  Conradie JA assumed that the conduct of Transnet in dismissing the applicant constituted 
administrative action, para 26. 
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Cameron JA held that the decision of a State organ to dismiss an employee 
constitutes administrative action.58  He relied upon Zenzile59 which held that a public 
sector employer is a public authority whose decision to dismiss involves the exercise 
of public power.60  That the applicant’s contract of employment or Transnet’s 
authority to employ the applicant “did not derive from a particular, discernable, 
statutory provision” is of no significance, Cameron JA reasoned.61  What matters, he 
said, is that Transnet is a public entity created by legislation and operating under 
statutory authority.  Cameron JA concluded that when Transnet dismissed Chirwa, 
its action trenched on two constitutional rights, namely, her right to fair labour 
practices and her right to just administrative action.62 
 
Cameron JA therefore upheld Chirwa’s contention that she had two causes of action 
as a result of her dismissal; one under the LRA, the other under the Constitution and 
PAJA.  In upholding this contention he reasoned that the fact that an employee has 
remedies under the LRA does not preclude the employee from approaching the High 
Court for relief.63  He expressed the view that he could not find any doctrine of 
constitutional law which confines a beneficiary of more than one constitutional right 
to only one remedy.64  Nor, he reasoned, could he find any “intention to prefer one 
legislative embodiment of a protected right over another; nor any preferent 
entrenchment of rights or of the legislation springing from them”.65 
 
It is necessary to refer to two recent decisions of the Labour Court and the High 
Court which reach different conclusions on this issue.  The first is SA Police Union v 
National Commissioner of SA Police Services (SA Police Union), a decision of the 
Labour Court.66  In this case the primary issue was whether the decision of the 
Commissioner to introduce the adapted eight-hour shift constituted administrative 
                                                 
58  Para 47. 
59  Supra. 
60  34B-D; 270F-G. 
61  Above fn 3 at para 52. 
62  Para 57. 
63  Paras 63-65. 
64  Para 63. 
65  Para 65. 
66  SA Police Union above fn 62.  This decision was followed by the Labour Court in Hlope above n 
62. 
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action.  The court concluded that the conduct of the Commissioner in question did 
not constitute administrative action.67  The reasoning of the Labour Court rests on 
three main propositions.  The first is that the Constitution draws a distinction between 
administrative action and labour relations.  The court reasoned that these are “two 
distinct species of juridical acts [to which the Constitution] subjects … different forms 
of regulation, review and enforcement”.68  The second is that “[t]here is nothing 
inherently public about setting the working hours of police officers”.69  Employment 
relations, the court said, “are conducted internally in service of the immediate 
objectives of the organ of state and are premised upon a contractual relationship of 
trust and good faith”.70 
 
Lastly, the court held that there was “no logical, legitimate or justifiable basis upon 
which to categorise all employment conduct in the public sector as administrative 
action”.71  But Zenzile, which held that the dismissal of workers by a public body 
does not fall beyond the reach of administrative law and that the decision to dismiss 
a public sector employee involved the exercise of public power, stood in its way.  
The court reasoned that because the LRA has been extended to virtually all 
employees, including those in the public sector, it is no longer necessary to apply the 
principles of administrative law to the field of employment relations.  It concluded that 
cases such as Zenzile which extended labour rights to public sector employees 
“have lost their force following the codification of our administrative law and labour 
law, and the extension of full labour rights to public sector employees by the LRA”.72 
 
This decision must be contrasted with the High Court decision in Police and Prisons 
Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services (POPCRU),73 which was 
handed down by the Eastern Cape High Court after the Labour Court decision in SA 
Police Union.  This case concerned an application to review the decision of the 
Department of Correctional Services to dismiss some of its employees.  The 
                                                 
67  SA Police Union above fn 62 at para 51. 
68  Para 54. 
69  Para 51. 
70  Para 52. 
71  Para 62. 
72  Para 66. 
73  POPCRU above fn 63.  This decision was followed by the Labour Court in Nxele above fn 63. 
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Department contended that the decision to dismiss its employees did not constitute 
administrative action and consequently was not reviewable under the provisions of 
PAJA.  The court held that the decision in question constituted the exercise of public 
power and thus amounted to administrative action.74  Factors which influenced the 
court in concluding that the power involved was public, included the statutory basis 
of the power to employ and dismiss correctional officers, the subservience of the 
officials to the Constitution generally, and the public character of the Department.75 
 
The court rejected the argument that it is neither necessary nor desirable for one act 
to attract the protection of both labour law and administrative law.  It reasoned firstly 
that the fundamental right to fair labour practices does not trump every other right.76  
The right to administrative justice and the right to fair labour practices provide 
employees with rights which “are complimentary and cumulative, not destructive of 
each other simply because they are different”.77  The second proposition is that there 
is nothing incongruous about individuals having more legal protection rather than 
less, or more than one fundamental right applying to one act, or more than one 
branch of law applying to the same set of facts.78  The third proposition is that 
section 157(2) of the LRA envisages that certain employment-related acts will also 
be administrative acts when vesting jurisdiction in the Labour Court concurrent with 
the jurisdiction of the High Court.79 
 
4.4 THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: CHIRWA v TRANSNET 
 
In this case the Chief Justice held that the High Court had jurisdiction because the 
Chirwa alleged a violation of the constitutional right to administrative action, a right in 
the Bill of Rights.  However, he found that the decision to terminate Chirwa’s 
employment contract did not constitute administrative action under PAJA for two 
reasons.  First, the dismissal of Chirwa did not take place in terms of any statutory 
                                                 
74  POPCRU above fn 63 at para 54. 
75  Ibid. 
76  Para 59. 
77  Para 60. 
78  Ibid. 
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authority, but rather in terms of the contract of employment.80  Second, the dismissal 
did not constitute the exercise of public power.81  In this regard he found that the 
source of Transnet’s power to dismiss is contractual and this “point[s] strongly in the 
direction that the power is not a public one”.82 
 
Ngcobo was unable to agree with the view that in dismissing Chirwa, Transnet did 
not exercise public power.  In his view, what makes the power in question a public 
power is the fact that it has been vested in a public functionary, who is required to 
exercise the power in the public interest.  When a public official performs a function 
in relation to his or her duties, the public official exercises public power.  Ngcobo 
agreed with Cameron JA that Transnet is a creature of statute.  It is a public entity 
created by the statute and it operates under statutory authority.  As a public 
authority, its decision to dismiss necessarily involves the exercise of public power 
and, “[t]hat power is always sourced in statutory provision, whether general or 
specific, and, behind it, in the Constitution”.83  Indeed, in Hoffmann v South African 
Airways,84 the Constitutional Court held that “Transnet is a statutory body, under the 
control of the State, which has public powers and performs public functions in the 
public interest”.85 
 
However, reasoned Ngcobo, the fact that the conduct of Transnet, in terminating 
Chirwa’s employment contract, involves the exercise of public power is not decisive 
of the question whether the exercise of the power in question constitutes 
administrative action.  The question whether particular conduct constitutes 
administrative action must be determined by reference to section 33 of the 
Constitution.  Section 33 of the Constitution confines its operation to “administrative 
action”, as does PAJA.  Therefore to determine whether conduct is subject to review 
under section 33 and thus under PAJA, the threshold question is whether the 
conduct under consideration constitutes administrative action.  PAJA only comes into 
                                                 
80  Para [185]. 
81  Para [194]. 
82  Para [189]. 
83  Ibid. 
84  2001 (1) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC); (2000) 21 ILJ 2357 (CC); [2000] 12 BLLR 
1365 (CC). 
85  Para 23. 
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the picture once it is determined that the conduct in question constitutes 
administrative action under section 33.  The appropriate starting point is to determine 
whether the conduct in question constitutes administrative action within the meaning 
of section 33 of the Constitution.86  The question therefore is whether the conduct of 
Transnet in terminating Chirwa’s contract of employment constitutes administrative 
action under section 33. 
 
In SARFU,87 the Constitutional Court emphasised that not all conduct of State 
functionaries entrusted with public authority will constitute administrative action 
under section 33.  The court illustrated this by drawing a distinction between the 
constitutional responsibility of cabinet ministers to ensure the implementation of 
legislation and their responsibility to develop policy and to initiate legislation.  It 
pointed out that the former constitutes administrative action, while the latter does not.  
It held that “the test for determining whether conduct constitutes ‘administrative 
action’ is not the question whether the action concerned is performed by a member 
of the executive arm of government”.88  But what matters is the function that is 
performed.  The question is whether the task that is performed is itself administrative 
action or not.89 
 
Against this background the court concluded: 
 
“Determining whether an action should be characterised as the implementation 
of legislation or the formulation of policy may be difficult.  It will, as we have said 
above, depend primarily upon the nature of the power.  A series of 
considerations may be relevant to deciding on which side of the line a particular 
action falls.  The source of the power, though not necessarily decisive, is a 
relevant factor.  So, too, is the nature of the power, its subject-matter, whether it 
involves the exercise of a public duty and how closely it is related on the one 
hand to policy matters, which are not administrative, and on the other to the 
implementation of legislation, which is.  While the subject-matter of a power is 
not relevant to determine whether constitutional review is appropriate, it is 
relevant to determine whether the exercise of the power constitutes 
administrative action for the purposes of section 33.  Difficult boundaries may 
have to be drawn in deciding what should and what should not be characterised 
                                                 
86  Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd [2007] ZACC 22 at para 202 and Minister of Health 
NO v New Clicks South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Treatment Action Campaign as Amici Curiae) 2006 (2) 
SA 311 (CC); 2006 (1) BCLR 1 (CC) at para 100. 
87  Above fn 64. 
88  Para 141. 
89  Ibid. 
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as administrative action for the purposes of section 33.  These will need to be 
drawn carefully in the light of the provisions of the Constitution and the overall 
constitutional purpose of an efficient, equitable and ethical public administration.  
This can best be done on a case by case basis.”90  
 
The subject matter of the power involved here is the termination of Chirwa’s contract 
of employment by Transnet for poor work performance.  The source of the power is 
the employment contract between Chirwa and Transnet.  The nature of the power 
involved here is therefore contractual.  The fact that Transnet is a creature of statute 
does not detract from the fact that in terminating the applicant’s contract of 
employment, it was exercising its contractual power.  It does not involve the 
implementation of legislation which constitutes administrative action.  The conduct of 
Transnet in terminating the employment contract does not, in Ngcobo’s view, 
constitute administration.  It is more concerned with labour and employment 
relations.  The mere fact that Transnet is an organ of State which exercises public 
power does not transform its conduct in terminating Chirwa’s employment contract 
into administrative action.  Section 33 is not concerned with every act of 
administration performed by an organ of state.  It followed therefore that the conduct 
of Transnet did not constitute administrative action under section 33, Ngcobo found. 
 
Support for the view that the termination of the employment of a public sector 
employee does not constitute administrative action under section 33 can be found in 
the structure of our Constitution.  The Constitution draws a clear distinction between 
administrative action on the one hand and employment and labour relations on the 
other.  It recognises that employment and labour relations and administrative action 
are two different areas of laws.  It is true they may share some characteristics.  
Administrative law falls exclusively in the category of public law while labour law has 
elements of administrative law, procedural law, private law and commercial law.91 
 
The Constitution contemplates that these two areas will be subjected to different 
forms of regulation, review and enforcement.  It deals with labour and employment 
relations separately.  This is dealt with in section 23 under the heading “Labour 
Relations”.  In particular, section 23(1) guarantees to “[e]veryone … the right to fair 
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labour practices”.  The Constitution contemplates that labour relations will be 
regulated through collective bargaining and adjudication of unfair labour practices.  
To this extent, section 23 of the Constitution guarantees the right of every employee 
and every employer to form and join a trade union or an employers’ organisation, as 
the case may be. 
 
Nor is there anything, either in the language of section 23 or the context in which that 
section occurs, to support the proposition that the resolution of labour and 
employment disputes in the public sector should be regulated differently from 
disputes in the private sector.  On the contrary, section 23 contemplates that 
employees regardless of the sector in which they are employed will be governed by 
it.  The principle underlying section 23 is that the resolution of employment disputes 
in the public sector will be resolved through the same mechanisms and in 
accordance with the same values as in the private sector, namely, through collective 
bargaining and the adjudication of unfair labour practice as opposed to judicial 
review of administrative action.92  It is apparent from the Public Administration 
provisions of the Constitution that employment relations in the public service are 
governed by fair employment practices. 
 
Section 195 which sets out the basic values and principles governing public 
administration, includes as part of those values and principles, “employment and 
personnel management practices based on … fairness”.93  These provisions 
contemplate fair employment practices.  In addition, one of the powers and functions 
of the Public Service Commission is “to give directions aimed at ensuring that 
personnel procedures relating to … dismissals comply with [fair employment 
practices]”.94  This flows from the requirement that dismissals in the public service 
must comply with the values set out in section 195(1).  These provisions echo the 
right to fair labour practices in section 23(1).  And finally, section 197(2) provides that 
the terms and conditions of employment in the public service must be regulated by 
national legislation. 
 
                                                 
92  SA Police Union above fn 62 at para 55. 
93  S 195(1). 
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These provisions must be understood in the light of section 23 of the Constitution 
which deals with labour relations, and in particular, section 23(1) which guarantees 
to everyone the right to fair labour practices.  Section 197(2) does not detract from 
this.  It must be read as complementing and supplementing section 23 in affording 
employees protection.  Indeed, the LRA, which was enacted to give effect to section 
23 of the Constitution, and the Public Service Act, 1994,95 which was enacted to give 
effect to section 197(2) of the Constitution, complement and supplement one 
another.  By its own terms, the LRA governs all employees, including those in the 
public sector except those specifically excluded.  For its part, the Public Service Act 
which governs, among other things, the “terms and conditions of employment” 
expressly provides that the power to discharge an officer or employee “shall be 
exercised with due observance of the applicable provisions of the Labour Relations 
Act, 1995”.96 
 
As pointed out somewhere above, the line of cases which hold the power to dismiss 
amounts to administrative action rely on Zenzile.  The Chirwa case and its progeny 
must be understood in the light of our history.  Historically, recourse was had to 
administrative law in order to protect employees who did not enjoy the protection that 
private sector employees enjoyed.  Since the advent of the new constitutional order, 
all that has changed.  Section 23 of the Constitution guarantees to every employee, 
including public sector employees, the right to fair labour practices.  The LRA, the 
Employment Equity Act, 1998,97 and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act, 
1997,98 have codified labour and employment rights.  The purpose of the LRA and 
the Basic Conditions of Employment Act99 is to give effect to and regulate the 
fundamental right to fair labour practices conferred by section 23 of the Constitution. 
Both the LRA and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act were enacted to give 
effect to section 23, now govern the public sector employees, except those who are 
specifically excluded from its provisions.  Labour and employment rights such as the 
right to a fair hearing, substantive fairness and remedies for non-compliance are now 
                                                 
95  Act 103 of 1994. 
96  S 17(1). 
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codified in the LRA.100  It was no longer necessary therefore to treat public sector 
employees differently and subject them to the protection of administrative law, 
Ngcobo determined. 
 
Labour and employment relations are dealt with comprehensively in section 23 of the 
Constitution.  Section 33 of the Constitution does not deal with labour and 
employment relations.  There is no longer a distinction between private and public 
sector employees under our Constitution.  The starting point under our Constitution 
is that all workers should be treated equally and any deviation from this principle 
should be justified.  There is no reason in principle why public sector employees who 
fall within the ambit of the LRA should be treated differently from private sector 
employees and be given more rights than private sector employees.  Therefore, 
Ngcobo was unable to agree with the view that a public sector employee, who 
challenges the manner in which a disciplinary hearing that resulted in his or her 
dismissal, has two causes of action, one flowing from the LRA and another flowing 
from the Constitution and PAJA. 
 
Ngcobo concluded that the decision by Transnet to terminate Chirwa’s contract of 
employment did not constitute administrative action under section 33 of the 
Constitution.  This conclusion rendered it unnecessary to decide whether PAJA 
applied or not. 
 
For all these reasons, he held that the dispute between Chirwa and Transnet fell 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Labour Court.  It followed therefore that the 
High Court did not have jurisdiction in respect of Chirwa’s claim. 
 
4.5 ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION IN TERMS OF PAJA 
 
Section 1 of PAJA defines administrative action as follows: 
 
“any decision taken, or any failure to take a decision, by - 
(a) an organ of state, when - 
                                                 
100  Ss 138, 185-188 and 193-195 of the LRA. 
 38  
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial 
constitution; or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of 
any legislation; or 
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a 
public power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering 
provision, 
which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a direct, external 
legal effect”. 
 
The relevant part of the definition in this matter is contained in sub-section (a)(ii).  In 
order for the dismissal of Chirwa to constitute administrative action under that part of 
the definition, seven requirements must be met:101 the dismissal must be 
 
(i) a decision,102 
(ii) by an organ of state,  
(iii) exercising a public power or performing a public function, 
(iv) in terms of any legislation, 
(v) that adversely affects someone’s rights, 
(vi) which has a direct, external, legal effect, and 
(vii) that does not fall under any of the exclusions listed in section 1 of PAJA.103 
                                                 
101  Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2005 (6) SA 313 (SCA); 2005 (10) 
BCLR 931 (SCA) at para 21. 
102  PAJA defines “decision” as - 
“any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be made, or required to 
be made, as the case may be, under an empowering provision, including a decision 
relating to - 
(a) making, suspending, revoking or refusing to make an order, award or 
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“(aa) the executive powers or functions of the National Executive, including the 
powers or functions referred to in sections 79(1) and (4), 84(2)(a), (b), (c), (d), 
(f), (g), (h), (i) and (k), 85(2)(b), (c), (d) and (e), 91(2), (3), (4) and (5), 92(3), 93, 
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(bb) the executive powers or functions of the Provincial Executive, including the 
powers or functions referred to in sections 121(1) and (2), 125(2)(d), (e) and (f), 
126, 127(2), 132(2), 133(3)(b), 137, 138, 139 and 145(1) of the Constitution; 
(cc) the executive powers or functions of a municipal council; 
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The dismissal clearly constituted a decision by an organ of state104 that adversely 
and directly affected someone’s rights, which did not fall under any of the 
enumerated exclusions.  It is worth consideration whether it was taken in terms of 
any legislation and whether it amounted to an exercise of public power or the 
performance of a public function.  The conclusions reached on those questions make 
it unnecessary to consider whether the decision had an “external” effect. 
 
In terms of any legislation the South African Transport Services Conditions of 
Service Act105 used to govern the conditions of service of Transnet employees.  After 
this Act lapsed,106 no successor was enacted in its place.  Currently the terms and 
conditions of service are controlled through contracts. 
 
However, it could be argued that the Legal Succession to the South African 
Transport Services Act,107 the statute founding Transnet, is the source of all powers 
and functions providing the basis for its operational activities, including those of a 
contractual nature.108  This argument cannot hold water, the Chief Justice Langa 
opined. It would render the requirement that the decision be taken “in terms of any 
legislation” meaningless, as all decisions taken by a body created by statute would 
meet the requirement. If that is what the legislature intended, one would have 
                                                                                                                                                        
(dd) the legislative functions of Parliament, a provincial legislature or a municipal 
council; 
(ee) the judicial functions of a judicial officer of a court referred to in section 166 of 
the Constitution or of a Special Tribunal established under section 2 of the 
Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act, 1996 (Act No. 74 of 
1996), and the judicial functions of a traditional leader under customary law or 
any other law; 
(ff) a decision to institute or continue a prosecution; 
(gg) a decision relating to any aspect regarding the nomination, selection or 
appointment of a judicial officer or any other person, by the Judicial Service 
Commission in terms of any law; 
(hh) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of any provision of the 
Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000; or 
(ii) any decision taken, or failure to take a decision, in terms of section 4(1)”. 
104  Hoffmann above at para 23: “Transnet is a statutory body, under the control of the State, which 
has public powers and performs public functions in the public interest.”  The Court went on to 
hold that SAA, as a business unit of Transnet was also an organ of state.  The Transnet 
Pension Fund is also a business unit of Transnet and is therefore also an organ of state. 
105  Act 41 of 1988. 
106  The Act lapsed as of 6 October 1991. 
107  Act 9 of 1989. 
108  Chirwa above at para 52 (Cameron JA). 
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expected them to have said as much. Instead they chose to distinguish between 
powers exercised by the same body, including a body created by legislation, 
according to the source of the power. 
 
There is, furthermore, no legislative provision in other legislation providing for the 
appointment and dismissal of persons in the position previously occupied by 
Chirwa.109 The Transnet Pension Fund Amendment Act110 only makes provision for 
the appointment of employees in particular positions, which are generally of a 
managerial or other high-responsibility nature.111 
 
It followed, therefore, that the dismissal of Chirwa did not take place in terms of any 
statutory authority, but rather in terms of the contract itself.  Therefore, the decision 
could not, for this reason alone, amount to administrative action.112  The question 
then turned on whether or not the dismissal of Chirwa amounted to the exercise of a 
public power or performance of a public function. 
 
Exercising a public power or performing a public function 
 
“Determining whether a power or function is ‘public’ is a notoriously difficult 
exercise.  There is no simple definition or clear test to be applied.  Instead, it is a 
question that has to be answered with regard to all the relevant factors including: 
 
(a) the relationship of coercion or power that the actor has in its capacity as a 
public institution; 
(b) the impact of the decision on the public; 
(c) the source of the power; and 
(d) whether there is a need for the decision to be exercised in the public 
interest. 
 
                                                 
109  The absence of a statutory power to dismiss immediately distinguishes the Chirwa case from 
Administrator, Natal v Sibiya 1992 (4) SA 532 (A) at 543E-F and Administrator, Transvaal v 
Zenzile 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) at 26D-E.  In both cases the decision to dismiss was taken in terms 
of a statutory power. 
110  Act 41 of 2000. 
111  For example s 12(1) of the Amendment Act governs the appointment and dismissal of a 
Manager (Principal Officer): “The Managing Director shall appoint a member of the personnel of 
the employer to be the Manager (Principal Officer) of the Fund and may, at any stage, terminate 
such appointment.”  Similarly, the appointment and dismissal of the Secretary is regulated by s 
13(1): “The Managing Director shall appoint a member of the personnel of an employer as the 
Secretary of the Fund and may, at any stage, terminate any such appointment.” 
112  Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC 2001 (3) SA 1013 
(SCA); 2001 (10) BCLR 1026 (SCA) at para 18. 
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None of these factors will necessarily be determinative; instead, a court must 
exercise its discretion considering their relative weight in the context.” 
 
The first factor was particularly relevant in Cape Metropolitan Council v Metro 
Inspection Services (Western Cape) CC where the Supreme Court of Appeal found 
that a decision to terminate a contract was not administrative action, because the 
organ of state in question had contracted in an equal power relation with a powerful 
commercial entity without any additional advantage flowing from its public position.113  
In the Chirwa case, in exercising its contractual rights Transnet had no specific 
authority over its employees, in general, and gains no advantage over Chirwa in 
particular, by virtue of the fact that it is a public body.  The power it has over its 
employees flows merely from its position as an employer and would be identical if it 
had been a private company.114  In this context, therefore, the presence of a power 
imbalance between Chirwa and Transnet was of diminished importance, Chief 
Justice Langa noted. 
 
Secondly, Chirwa’s dismissal would have a very small impact, if any on the public.115  
While Transnet conducts work that has a constant and significant public impact, it 
was important to recognise the Chirwa’s role in that venture.  Her job was to ensure 
the smooth running of the Transnet Pension Fund.  While that was important to 
Transnet employees, its impact on the public at large is further removed.  She 
affected the proper functioning of the body that ensures the future of Transnet 
employees after retirement.  She did not take decisions regarding transport policy or 
practice, and while her work might in some way have affected the morale of the 
                                                 
113  Para 18.  See also Logbro Properties CC v Bedderson NO 2003 (2) SA 460 (SCA) at para 10. 
114  This fact immediately distinguishes the Chirwa case from those cases that deal with state 
tendering.  See, for example, Logbro above fn 113 at para 8 where Cameron JA held, in the 
tendering context, that “[t]he principles of administrative justice … framed the parties’ 
contractual relationship, and continued in particular to govern the province’s exercise of the 
rights it derived from the contract”.  In this respect, see the comments of Murphy AJ in SAPU v 
National Commissioner of the South African Police Service [2006] 1 BLLR 42 (LC); (2005) 26 
ILJ 2403 (LC) at para 52, that “there is considerable contextual difference between tendering 
and employment.  Tendering serves the public interest in promoting competition in the provision 
of services to government and advances equality in business development.  …  Employment 
relationships, on the other hand, are conducted internally in service of the immediate objectives 
of the organ of state and are premised upon a contractual relationship of trust and good faith”. 
115  Impact on the public was the deciding factor in Johannesburg Stock Exchange v Witwatersrand 
Nigel Ltd 1988 (3) SA 132 (A) at 152E-I and Dawnlaan Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange 1983 (3) SA 344 (W) at 364H-365A. 
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people who did take those decisions, the ultimate effect of her dismissal on the 
public service provided by Transnet was negligible. 
 
The next relevant factor was the source of the power.116  As noted above, in the 
Chirwa case, the power is contractual.  It must again be stressed that this factor is 
not always decisive,117 but is one that can have relevance.  In this instance, it 
seemed simply to point strongly in the direction that the power was not a public one. 
 
Finally, certain powers must be exercised for public, rather than private benefit.  In 
Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union v Minister of Correctional Services 
(POPCRU)118 the question arose whether the dismissal of a number of correctional 
officers for refusing to work amounted to the exercise of a public power.  The court 
held that where there was limited or no impact on the public at large, 
 
“what makes the power involved a public power is the fact that it has been vested 
in a public functionary who is required to exercise it in the public interest, and not 
in his or her own private interest or at his or her own whim.”119 
 
Factors that strengthened the view of the court that the dismissal did amount to the 
exercise of a public power were: the subservience of the Department to the 
Constitution generally and section 195 in particular; the public character of the 
Department and the “pre-eminence of the public interest” in the proper administration 
of prisons; and the attainment of the purposes specified in the Correctional Services 
Act 111 of 1998.120 
 
None of these “strengthening factors” were present in the Chirwa case, Chief Justice 
Langa found.  Whilst Transnet is certainly subservient to the Constitution, so are all 
business entities in South Africa.  In any event, subservience to the Constitution can 
very rarely be decisive, since every legal person, whether private or public, is 
                                                 
116  See President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football Union 2000 (1) 
SA 1 (CC); 1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC) at para 143; Cape Metropolitan above fn 112 at paras 
17-18; and SAPU above fn 114 at para 51. 
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subservient to the Constitution.  The Transnet Pension Fund does not have the 
same public character that the Correctional Services Department has. Section 2 of 
the Correctional Services Act sets out the aims of the Department,121 which clearly 
have a public element.  The Transnet Pension Fund does not have such obviously 
public goals.122  Lastly, whilst there is a clear “pre-eminence” of public interest in the 
proper administration of correctional services, the same could not be said for the 
Human Resources Department of the Transnet Pension Fund. 
 
The approach followed in POPCRU is similar to that adopted by the Supreme Court 
of Appeal in Bullock NO v Provincial Government, North West Province.123  The case 
concerned a decision of the North West Government to grant rights over land it 
owned on Hartebeestpoort Dam to a single private person.  In holding that the 
decision, despite flowing from the Government’s rights as owner, constituted 
administrative action, the court held: 
 
“The dam is a valuable recreational resource available to the public at large.  … 
A decision by the [North West Government] to grant, in perpetuity, a right over a 
part of the foreshore to one property owner to the exclusion of all other persons, 
significantly curtails access to that resource by the public.”124 
 
This factor is, of course, intimately linked to the impact a decision has on the public.  
In the Chirwa case, there did not seem to be any similar duty for Mr Smith to have 
acted in the public interest.  Instead, he was acting in the best interests of the 
Transnet Pension Fund and Transnet’s employees by ensuring the smooth running 
of their pension fund. 
                                                 
121  Section 2 reads - 
“The purpose of the correctional system is to contribute to maintaining and protecting 
a just, peaceful and safe society by - 
(a) enforcing sentences of the courts in the manner prescribed by this Act; 
(b) detaining all prisoners in safe custody whilst ensuring their human dignity; and 
(c) promoting the social responsibility and human development of all prisoners and 
persons subject to community corrections.” 
122  According to rule 2.2 of the Pension Fund Rules published in Government Gazette 21817 GN 
1300, 1 December 2000, the sole object of the Transnet Pension Fund is 
“to invest and administer the credit amounts in the Member Accounts and Reserve 
Accounts in respect of every Member for the benefit of such Member or their 
Dependants or Nominees as the case may be”. 
123  Bullock NO v Provincial Government, North West Province 2004 (5) SA 262 (SCA); [2004] 2 All 
SA 249 (SCA). 
124  Para 14. 
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For all these reasons, CJ Langa concluded that the dismissal of Chirwa by Transnet 
did not constitute the exercise of a “public” power or the performance of a “public” 
function, and therefore was not administrative action under PAJA.  It is important to 
note, however, that the above reasoning did not entail that dismissals of public 
employees will never constitute “administrative action” under PAJA.  Where, for 
example, the person in question is dismissed in terms of a specific legislative 
provision, or where the dismissal is likely to impact seriously and directly on the 
public by virtue of the manner in which it is carried out or by virtue of the class of 
public employee dismissed, the requirements of the definition of “administrative 
action” may be fulfilled. 
 
4.6  MAKING SENSE OF SIDUMO125 CASE  
4.6.1 SUMMARY OF BACKGROUND FACTS 
 
Sidumo was a security guard at the Rustenburg Platinum Mine and was required to 
conduct personal searches on employees at the end of the shift. He was observed to 
have failed to conduct personal searches on at least 23 occasions and was charged 
and dismissed for negligence and failure to follow (search) procedures. He won in 
the CCMA, Labour and Labour Appeal Courts (reinstatement and 3 months’ back 
pay) but lost in the SCA. The matter was then referred to the Constitutional Court. 
 
4.6.1.1 RULING BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
 
In reaching its determination, the Constitutional Court made the following 
observations:  
 
(i) Sidumo had breached a workplace rule (favoured the employer). 
 
(ii) The rule was important (favoured the employer). 
 
                                                 
125 Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Mines Ltd 2008 (2) BCLR 158 (CC) 
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(iii) The employer did not suffer any actual loss (in the form of stolen platinum) 
(favoured the employer). 
 
(iv) Sidumo had not acknowledged guilt and shown remorse (favoured the 
employer). 
 
(v) The misconduct by Sidumo did not involve dishonesty (favoured Sidumo). 
 
(vi) Sidumo could benefit from further training and counselling (favoured 
Sidumo). 
 
(vii) Sidumo had long service and a clean disciplinary record (favoured 
Sidumo). 
 
(viii) The award by the CCMA commissioner was not one that a reasonable 
decision maker could not have made. 
 
4.6.2 NATURE OF CCMA ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS 
 
The Constitutional Court has determined that the CCMA arbitration constitute 
administrative action as defined by the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
(“PAJA”) Navsa AJ, Moseneke DCJ, Madala J, O'Regan J (separate judgment) and 
Van Der Westhuizen J. 
Ngcobo J (and Mokgoro J, Nkabinde J and Skweyiya J) said that CCMA arbitration 
proceedings do not constitute administrative action but are adjudicative in nature. 
Sachs J said it is both administrative and adjudicative in nature and coins the 
concept of hybridity to the nature of the CCMA Arbitration proceedings. 
 
The majority found that the relief provided in PAJA, however, does not apply to the 
arbitration awards made by CCMA commissioners.  The LRA provides relief to those 
aggrieved by decisions of CCMA commissioners. 
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4.6.3 POWERS AND DUTIES OF COMMISSIONERS 
 
Commissioners must: 
 
(i) consider the matter afresh by hearing evidence; 
 
(ii) act impartially; 
 
(iii) consider whether the sanction imposed by the employer for misconduct is 
fair; 
 
(iv) not defer to the decision of the employer (rejection of reasonable employer 
test). 
 
4.6.4 RELEVANT FACTORS FOR COMMISSIONERS TO CONSIDER WHEN 
ARBITRATING UNFAIR DISMISSAL DISPUTES (MISCONDUCT CASES)  
 
CCMA Commissioners must take into account the following relevant factors when 
arbitration unfair dismissal disputes regarding misconduct cases: 
 
(i) The importance of the rule that the employee has breached; 
 
(ii) The reason the employer imposed the sanction; 
 
(iii) The basis of the employee’s challenge to the dismissal (admission of guilt, 
remorse); 
 
(iv) The harm caused (to the employer’s business) by the employee’s conduct; 
 
(v) Whether additional counselling and training may result in the employee not 
repeating the misconduct (progressive discipline); 
 
(vi) The effect of dismissal on the employee (personal circumstances like age, 
family responsibility, ability to get new job); 
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(vii) Long service record. 
 
4.6.5 A REVIEW OF SOME OF THE DECISIONS OF THE LAC AND THE LC 
SINCE SIDUMO 
 
 This section examines some of the notable cases that came before the 
courts after the Constitutional Court judgement in the Sidumo matter. 
Inasmuch as the cases did not deal exclusively with the administrative 
action per se, it does however, serve some useful purpose to review these 
cases with a view to see whether or not the Sidumo matter had any 
influence on the lower courts in determining labour disputes. It will also be 
noteworthy to examine the factors that the Courts take into account for 
purposes of determining the fairness or otherwise of dismissal disputes, in 
the face of Sidumo, and the remedies they mete out in this regard. 
 
4.6.5.1 FIDELITY CASH MANAGEMENT SERVICE v CCMA126 
 
Fidelity Cash Management Services is in the business of transporting cash.  An 
amount of R1.2 million was stolen from Virginia Airport, Durban.  The accused 
employee was a “Planner” and 4 charges were levelled against him namely:  
 
(i) Gross negligence. 
 
(ii) Dereliction of duty (failure to ensure that there was an escort vehicle at airport). 
 
(iii) Failure to comply with contract of employment which required him to take 
polygraph test.  
 
(iv) Failure to be at disciplinary enquiry on time. 
 
At the disciplinary hearing the employee was found guilty of all 4 charges and 
consequently summarily dismissed.  The matter was referred to the CCMA.  The 
                                                 
126  [2008] 3 BLLR 197 (LAC). 
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CCMA found the dismissal to be unfair and ordered retrospective reinstatement.  
The matter was referred to the Labour Court, and the court confirmed the CCMA 
ruling.  The matter was finally referred to the Labour Appeal Court.  The employer 
(FCMS) had relied on the following charges as reasons for the dismissal: 
 
(i) The employee’s refusal to undergo a polygraph test. 
 
(ii) The employee not being in the control room when he was supposed to be. 
 
(iii) Failure to supervise or monitor the control room properly (which resulted in 
the chain of events leading to the robbery). 
 
Therefore the charges the employer relied upon to justify dismissal at CCMA, LC and 
LAC were different to those for which the employee was dismissed. 
 
It is trite that an elementary principle of labour law provides that the fairness of a 
dismissal must be determined on the basis of the reasons for dismissal which the 
employer gave at the time of the dismissal. 
The employer no longer continues to justify the dismissal on the basis of the 
allegations of misconduct of which the employee was found guilty and for which he 
was dismissed.  The LAC found that the appeal fell to be dismissed on this ground 
alone. 
 
The LAC then considered in turn whether dismissal for any of the 4 charges was in 
any event justified.  The LAC went through each in turn and said it was not; therefore 
found no reason to interfere with the CCMA decision. 
 
The LAC made 5 main points about applying Sidumo: 
 
(i) A commissioner must not apply the reasonable employer test, must not, in 
any way, defer to the employer and must decide the issue on the basis of 
his or her own sense of fairness. 
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(ii) A commissioner conducting an arbitration is conducting administrative 
action. 
 
(iii) PAJA does not apply to such administrative action. 
 
(iv) Justifiability of administrative action in relation to the reasons given for it, 
as propounded in Carephone, as a ground of review of arbitration awards 
under section 145 does not apply any more. 
 
(v) The grounds of review set out in section 145 are suffused by the criterion 
of reasonableness and the constitutional requirement that arbitration 
awards must meet is that they must be lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
 
What must a commissioner do when deciding whether dismissal is a fair sanction 
or not? 
 
The commissioner must  
 
(i) Take into account the totality of circumstances. 
 
(ii) Consider the importance of the rule that had been breached. 
 
(iii) Consider the reason the employer imposed the sanction of dismissal, as 
s/he must take into account the basis of the employee’s challenge to the 
dismissal. 
 
(iv) Consider the harm caused by the employee’s conduct. 
 
(v) Consider whether additional training and instruction may result in the 
employee not repeating the misconduct. 
 
(vi) Consider the effect of dismissal on the employee. 
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(vii) Consider the employee’s service record. 
 
(viii) Take into account that LRA and the Code of Good Practice:  Dismissal. 
 
Then the commissioner must answer the question whether or not dismissal was, in 
all of the circumstances, a fair sanction and in such a case which finding must be 
reasonable. 
Sidumo does not require that an arbitration award be grossly unreasonable before it 
can be interfered with on review – it only requires it to be unreasonable.  This 
indicates a balance that a court must strike, namely:  on the one hand, interfering too 
much or too easily with arbitration awards; and on the other, refraining too much 
from interfering with awards. 
 
The test is whether or not the commissioner’s decision, one way or another, is one 
that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach in all of the circumstances.  The 
grounds of review in section 145 are not obliterated: 
 
Arbitration awards can be reviewed on the grounds, for example, that the CCMA had 
no jurisdiction in a matter or any of the other grounds specified in section 145. 
 
The reasonableness or otherwise of a commissioner’s decision does not depend – at 
least not solely – upon the reasons that the commissioner gives for the decision. 
 
Other reasons upon which the commissioner did not rely, to support the decision but 
which were legitimately before him and which can render the decision reasonable or 
unreasonable, can be taken into account. 
 
4.6.5.2 EDCON v CCMA127 
 
The facts relating to the above mentioned case are as follows: 
 
                                                 
127  [2008] 5 BLLR 391 (LAC). 
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The employee was dismissed for dishonesty in regard to accident with company 
vehicle (failing to report it). He was dishonest during the investigation stage. He was 
however not charged with the latter allegation, which caused the real breach of trust. 
 
The Labour Appeal Court found that the employee should have been charged with 
the real issue. 
 
4.6.5.3 HULLET ALUMINIUM (PTY) LTD v BARGAINING COUNCIL FOR THE 
METAL INDUSTRY128 
 
The facts relating to the above mentioned case are as follows: 
 
The case related to dismissal for dishonesty in respect to employee sales. 
The court said that the CCMA decision was not reasonable. The court determined 
that in this case dishonesty was involved, the employee showed no remorse, and 
finally found that consistency was not an issue because other employee’s case was 
different and thus not applicable. Accordingly the CCMA arbitration award was 
overturned on review. 
 
There are therefore instances/cases where the courts will still grant a review, when 
appropriate. 
 
4.6.5.4 PALABORWA MINING COMPANY LIMITED v CHEETHAM129 
 
The facts relating to the above mentioned case are as follows: 
 
The case is about the Company Secretary who got dismissed upon failing the 
random blood test for alcohol. The Labour Appeal Court refused to intervene and 
grant the review. The LAC said that the Labour Court should not “second guess” 
decisions of the CCMA. 
 
                                                 
128  [2008] JOL 21224 (LC). 
129  [2008] 6 BLLR 553 (LAC). 
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4.6.5.5 MANZINI v SAPS130  
The facts relating to the above mentioned case are as follows: 
 
The matter related to a Police Officer who was dismissed for corruption. 
The Police Officer claimed that there was no evidence to prove that he demanded or 
received a bribe. 
He was however present as the driver of vehicle when transaction took place. 
Inappropriate action took place in his presence. 
Technically he was not guilty of the allegation as specifically worded but clearly did 
wrong and knew or reasonably should have known so. 
 
The Labour Court was unwilling to find in his favour because of the imprecise 
tagging / wording of unacceptable conduct which caused irretrievable damage to 
relationship. 
 
The Labour Court followed the Fidelity131 case and Sidumo: 
 
The court reaffirmed that its task is to ensure that the CCMA decision falls within 
bounds of reasonableness. 
Although Commissioner did not refer to circumstantial evidence or inference to be 
drawn on the proven facts, there was an inference to be drawn that Manzini was 
taking part in corrupt activities (he drove the car and knew what was going on). 
 
Therefore his decision was one that a reasonable decision maker could reach in the 
circumstances. 
 
The questions that arise, notwithstanding, after reading this judgment are: 
 
What about the principle that the employee is entitled to be told allegations against 
him? 
 
                                                 
130  [2008] JOL 21865 (LC). 
131  See fn 126. 
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What about the principle that the fairness of a dismissal must be determined on the 
basis of the reasons for dismissal which the employer gave at the time of the 
dismissal? 
 
If the allegation was different, the employee might have decided to give evidence 
after all (here he did do so because he claimed that the employer had not made out 
its case). 
 
4.7 CONCLUSION 
 
As stated earlier, section 3 of the LRA provides, inter alia, that its provisions must be 
interpreted in compliance with the Constitution.  Section 145 therefore must be read 
to ensure that administrative action by the CCMA is lawful, reasonable and 
procedurally fair. 
 
The Carephone test, which was substantive and involved greater scrutiny than the 
rationality test set out in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, was formulated on the basis 
of the wording of the administrative justice provisions of the Constitution at the time, 
more particularly, that an award must be justifiable in relation to the reasons given 
for it.  Section 33(1) of the Constitution presently states that everyone has the right to 
administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.  The 
reasonableness standard should now suffuse section 145 of the LRA. 
 
The reasonableness standard was dealt with in Bato Star.  In the context of section 
6(2)(h) of PAJA, O’Regan J said the following: 
 
“[A]n administrative decision will be reviewable if, in Lord Cooke’s words, it is one 
that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach.” 
 
The Constitutional Court recognised that scrutiny of a decision based on 
reasonableness introduced a substantive ingredient into review proceedings. In 
judging a decision for reasonableness, it is often impossible to separate the merits 
from scrutiny.  However, the distinction between appeals and reviews continues to 
be significant. 
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Review for reasonableness, as explained by Professor Hoexter, does threaten the 
distinction between review and appeal.  The Labour Court in reviewing the awards of 
commissioners inevitably deals with the merits of the matter.  This does tend to blur 
the distinction between appeal and review.  She points out that it does so in the 
limited sense that it necessarily entails scrutiny of the merits of administrative 
decisions.  She states that the danger lies, not in careful scrutiny, but in “judicial 
overzealousness in setting aside administrative decisions that do not coincide with 
the judge’s own opinions”.  The Constitutional Court in Bato Star recognised that 
danger.  A judge’s task is to ensure that the decisions taken by administrative 
agencies fall within the bounds of reasonableness as required by the Constitution. 
 
To summarise, Carephone held that section 145 of the LRA was suffused by the 
then constitutional standard that the outcome of an administrative decision should be 
justifiable in relation to the reasons given for it.  The better approach is that section 
145 is now suffused by the constitutional standard of reasonableness.  That standard 
is the one explained in Bato Star: Is the decision reached by the commissioner one 
that a reasonable decision-maker could not reach?  Applying it will give effect not 
only to the constitutional right to fair labour practices, but also to the right to 
administrative action which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The analysis of reviews of CCMA awards by the labour courts, as contended 
throughout this study suggests that the persuasive evidence with respect to broader 
review function of CCMA awards by the Labour Courts requires a complex web of 
information and analysis.  The study has demonstrated that CCMA proceedings 
constitute administrative action as defined by the Promotion of Administrative Justice 
Act.  The relief provided in PAJA, however does not apply to the arbitration awards 
made by CCMA Commissioners.  The LRA provides relief to those aggrieved by 
decisions of CCMA commissioners. 
 
It is accordingly submitted that the scope for further comparable research in reviews 
in other areas of employment law is broad.  This study has focused on review 
function of CCMA awards by the Labour Courts with specific reference to the 
applicability or otherwise of PAJA.  It did not look at all possible reviews with the 
result that there are some unanswered questions even after Chirwa and Sidumo, 
such as: 
 
(i) Does the Chirwa case only cover dismissal disputes? 
(ii) Does any employment decision constitute administrative action? 
(iii) Can the Labour Court apply PAJA? 
(iv) Can employees still approach the High Court with contractual claims? 
 
The study has demonstrated that the following key practical points ought to be borne 
in mind when dealing with disciplinary matters: 
 
(i) The employer must investigate the allegations properly. 
 
(ii) The employer representative must get the charges right. 
 
(iii) The employer ought to show that it has taken all circumstances into 
account before deciding to dismiss. 
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(iv) If a party wants to succeed with a review s/he must show that the CCMA 
decision was unreasonable. 
 
(v) The decision of the CCMA can be reasonable on grounds other than those 
relied on by the commissioner. 
 
(vi) Parties can still review CCMA Awards on 145 grounds viz: 
 
o Misconduct by commissioner 
o Gross irregularity in conduct of proceedings 
o Exceeded powers / jurisdiction 
 
With regard to CCMA commissioners, the study has also established that the 
following is apposite: 
 
 A commissioner must not apply the reasonable employer test, must not in any 
way defer to the employer and must decide the issue on the basis of his or her 
own sense of fairness. 
 
 A commissioner conducting an arbitration is conducting administrative action. 
 
 PAJA does not apply to such administrative action. 
 
 Justifiability of administrative action in relation to the reasons given for it, as 
propounded in Carephone, as a ground of review of arbitration awards under 
section 145 does not apply any more. 
 
 The grounds of review set out in section 145 are suffused by the criterion of 
reasonableness and the constitutional requirement that arbitration awards must 
meet is that they must be lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. 
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The Constitutional Court in the Sidumo case did not require that an arbitration award 
be grossly unreasonable before it can be interfered with on review-it only requires it 
to be unreasonable. 
 
A fair hearing demands that at the very least there be some reasonably sustainable 
fit between the evidence and outcome.  The application of the standard of 
reasonableness requires scrutiny of the merits by the reviewing court but this does 
not mean that a review is now equal to an appeal. 
 
The test is whether or not the commissioner’s decision, one way or another, is one 
that a reasonable decision maker could not reach in all the circumstances.
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